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Abstract
Background: In many low-income countries, the private commercial sector plays an important role in the provision
of malaria treatment. However, the quality of care it provides is often poor, with artemisinin combination therapy
(ACT) generally being too costly for consumers. Decreasing ACT prices is critical for improving private sector treatment
outcomes and reducing the spread of artemisinin resistance. Yet limited evidence exists on the factors influencing
retailers’ pricing decisions. This study investigates the determinants of price mark-ups on anti-malarial drugs in retail
outlets in Cambodia.
Methods: Taking an economics perspective, the study tests the hypothesis that the structure of the anti-malarial
market determines the way providers set their prices. Providers facing weak competition are hypothesized to
apply high mark-ups and set prices above the competitive level. To analyse the relationship between market
competition and provider pricing, the study used cross-sectional data from retail outlets selling anti-malarial
drugs, including outlet characteristics data (e.g. outlet type, anti-malarial sales volumes), range of anti-malarial
drugs stocked (e.g. dosage form, brand status) and purchase and selling prices. Market concentration, a measure
of the level of market competition, was estimated using sales volume data. Market accessibility was defined based
on travel time to the closest main commercial area. Percent mark-ups were calculated using price data. The
relationship between mark-ups and market concentration was explored using regression analysis.
Results: The anti-malarial market was on average highly concentrated, suggesting weak competition. Higher
concentration was positively associated with higher mark-ups in moderately accessible markets only, with no
significant relationship or a negative relationship in other markets. Other determinants of pricing included
anti-malarial brand status and generic type, with higher mark-ups on cheaper products.
Conclusions: The results indicate that provider pricing as well as other key elements of anti-malarial supply and
demand may have played an important role in the limited access to appropriate malaria treatment in Cambodia.
The potential for an ACT price subsidy at manufacturer level combined with effective communications directed
at consumers and supportive private sector regulation should be explored to improve access to quality malaria
treatment in Cambodia.
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Background
In many low-income countries, private commercial pro-
viders play an important role in the provision of malaria
treatment [1–6]. Patient choice of private over public
sector providers is influenced by several factors including
the wider range of drugs stocked in private outlets, prox-
imity to patients’ homes, less frequent stock outs and
greater responsiveness to consumer preferences. However,
the quality of care they provide is often poor, with com-
mercial providers often lacking relevant qualifications and
adequate knowledge of malaria national treatment guide-
lines [7, 8].
One of the cornerstones of malaria control is parasito-
logical confirmation of all suspected malaria cases by either
microscopy or rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs) and treatment
of confirmed Plasmodium falciparum cases only with
artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT). By 2009,
most countries with P. falciparum had switched to ACT
as their first-line medicine, with the choice of combination
drugs based on their efficacy in specific countries.
The therapeutic life of ACT is, however, threatened by
resistance to artemisinins confirmed on the Cambodia-
Thailand border and more recently detected in two other
countries in the Greater Mekong subregion, Myanmar
and Vietnam [9]. This is of major concern to the inter-
national community, particularly as resistance may spread
to countries with much higher disease burdens in Africa,
as has been the case in the past for older anti-malarial
drugs [10–14]. The loss of ACT to resistance would be
catastrophic for malaria control strategies as no other
treatment with the same efficacy and tolerability is cur-
rently available [15].
Containing resistance to areas where it exists is, there-
fore, paramount. Factors believed to encourage the emer-
gence and spread of anti-malarial resistance include lack
of confirmed diagnosis through blood testing, the con-
sumption of oral artemisinin monotherapies (AMT), poor
consumer adherence to treatment regimens and poor qual-
ity drugs [16, 17]. Increasing access to parasitological diag-
nosis of all cases with suspected malaria and rational
treatment with affordable ACT for P. falciparum con-
firmed cases, including in the private sector, are key
recommended responses for the containment of artemi-
sinin resistance [9]. Complementary actions include the
removal of oral AMT and substandard and counterfeit
drugs from the market, and educative communication
campaigns targeting consumers and providers [18].
Cambodia finds itself at the heart of these issues, given
its malaria burden, resistance profile and large private sector.
Malaria transmission is seasonal (from May to December)
and is concentrated in forested areas. Around 15 % of the
population (2.2 m people) is at risk of infection, predomin-
antly male adults. The national malaria treatment policy
specifies that all people with suspected malaria should
first receive a blood test, either using microscopy or
RDTs [19]. At the time of the study in 2009, first-line
treatment of confirmed uncomplicated adult P. falcip-
arum cases consisted of the ACT artesunate and meflo-
quine (ASMQ) for three days while first-line treatment
of Plasmodium vivax cases was chloroquine, also for
three days [19]. The sale and distribution of oral AMT
had been prohibited. In 2009, the country could be roughly
divided into two strata: the Western part where resistance
was confirmed or suspected, and the North and Northeast,
where P. falciparum remained susceptible to ACT.
In 2009, the commercial sector supplied about 75 % of
all malaria treatments in Cambodia [20, 21]. Commercial
anti-malarial providers included pharmacies or clinical
pharmacies, drug shops, mobile providers, grocery stores
and village shops. ACT and RDTs have been the focus of
a social marketing programme since 2002, which includes
consumer behaviour change communication, provider train-
ing, and the sale of subsidized ACT and RDTs. In 2009, one
adult pack of ACT was sold to commercial providers
for US$0.42 with a recommended retail consumer price
(RRP) of US$0.61 printed on each pack. In the public
sector, parasitological diagnosis and anti-malarials were
available free of charge from government-owned outlets,
including health centres and hospitals and a network of
trained volunteers (referred to as Village Malaria Workers
(VMWs)) [20] in areas with high malaria risk and with no
access to health facilities.
Despite these initiatives, evidence shows that in 2009
clinical practices rarely followed national treatment guide-
lines and that the quality of fever management was often
low both at public and private outlets [20]. Overall, only
47 % of positive malaria cases received an anti-malarial
and 35 % an ACT [22] whilst AMT, which are banned,
accounted for 15 % of all anti-malarials dispensed [20].
“Cocktail therapies”, a mix of several different drugs, were
the most common treatment for malaria fevers received in
the commercial sector, with 47 % of respondents receiving
a cocktail containing no anti-malarial and 11 % a cocktail
with an anti-malarial drug [20]. These poor treatment
practices are related to ACT availability and consumers’
perceptions of product quality. Whilst knowledge about
the recommended first line treatment for P. falciparum
was generally high amongst anti-malarial drug sellers
[20], ACT availability was low, ranging between 1 % and
49 % across different commercial provider types [20]. It
has been reported that provision of cocktail treatments
may be perceived by consumers as reflecting provider
knowledge and expertise [21, 23] whilst oral AMT may
be seen as causing fewer side effects than the ACT
ASMQ [21, 24].
Despite the subsidy programme, retail price is also still
likely to have been an important determinant of ACT
uptake. For instance, in 2009 the median retail price of
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one ACT adult equivalent treatment dose (AETD) was
US$1.18, roughly two times the RRP. The structure of
the market for anti-malarial drugs is likely to have an
important impact on private sector prices. A market is
commonly defined as the set of sellers and buyers of a
good or service whose interactions determine the quan-
tity, quality and price of the good or service [25]. Market
structure is defined as the characteristics of the market,
including the range of sellers and products available, the
number of sellers and their relative importance in terms
of sales volumes and values (also referred as the degree
of market concentration), the presence and intensity of
barriers to market entry and exit, the structure of the
retail distribution chain and the regulatory system.
The structure-conduct-performance (SCP) framework
predicts that the structure of the market determines
the way firms behave which, in turn, affects market
performance [26]. In particular, providers facing weak
competition may have the opportunity to raise their
prices above levels seen in more competitive markets.
Weak competition is traditionally characterized by
more concentrated markets, where fewer providers
account for larger market shares [27]. This is com-
pounded if there is limited competition from potential
new providers (termed limited contestability), due to
high barriers to entering the market such as costly re-
tail outlet license fees.
Few studies have investigated the association between
market structure and price setting decisions in health care
markets in low-income countries [28–33]. One study in
rural Tanzania found that higher prices were statistically
associated with higher market concentration [32]. The
aim of this paper is to analyse the determinants of re-
tailers’ price setting decisions for anti-malarial drugs in
Cambodia, and draw policy recommendations for im-
proved access to affordable quality malaria treatment
and resistance containment.
Methods
Study design
The study draws on cross-sectional survey data from
anti-malarial outlets to define the boundaries of the
markets under study, calculate market concentration,
measure pricing using price or price mark-up data,
and assess the association between pricing and mar-
ket concentration through regression analysis. The
regression analysis controls for cost and quality varia-
tions that may also affect pricing using market, outlet
and product characteristics. Product-level variables
include anti-malarial generic type, dosage form and
brand status, while outlet-level variables are outlet
type, outlet location (drug resistance stratum), number of
years in operation, anti-malarial volume sold during
the week preceding the survey and wholesaler delivery
practices. Market-level variables include accessibility
and malaria transmission risk. For example, in more
remote markets, it is likely to be more costly to obtain
drug supplies (e.g. due to transport costs) putting
upward pressure on prices. In markets with higher
risk of malaria transmission, competition from govern-
ment providers, notably VMWs who give free treat-
ment and are physically more accessible, may be more
intense than in areas at lower risk, constraining com-
mercial providers’ pricing. Markets in areas of high
malaria transmission could also be more contestable (with
lower entry barriers), contributing to lower commercial
prices.
Data sources
Data from the 2009 Cambodia ACTwatch outlet survey
were used. The ACTwatch outlet survey is a nationally
representative cross-sectional study conducted in a sample
of outlets in 38 sub-districts. A sub-district is the catch-
ment area of a government health centre, which provides
primary health care services to around 10,000 inhabitants.
Details on the outlet survey design and survey proce-
dures are published elsewhere [20]. Briefly, the sample
of 38 sub-districts was stratified by drug resistance
level, with 19 sub-districts sampled from areas with
suspected or confirmed artemisinin resistance and 19
from areas with no artemisinin resistance. In each
stratum, the 19 sub-districts were sampled using prob-
ability proportional to population size. In each sam-
pled sub-district, a census of all public and private
outlets that stocked anti-malarial drugs was conducted.
Data collected included outlet characteristics, anti-malarial
drugs stocked, and, for each anti-malarial stocked,
purchase and selling prices and recall of volumes sold
over the previous week. Data on cocktails were ex-
cluded as it was not possible to assess their content
and therefore whether they contained an anti-malarial,
and if they did which one. Census data on outlet char-
acteristics and range of anti-malarial drugs stocked
were used to define the markets for malaria treatment
(as described below), and to control for product qual-
ity and cost variations in the analysis of providers’
price setting decisions. Sales volume data were used to
measure market concentration. Market level variables
(accessibility and transmission risk) were drawn from
the 2008 Cambodia national census data, National
Establishment Listing, Ministry of Health (MOH) risk
categorization of malaria endemic areas, and inter-
views with key stakeholders.
Defining markets
The literature conventionally defines markets along geo-
graphic and product lines. The product definition was
set as all anti-malarial drug types stocked by all outlets
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selling anti-malarials based on census data from the
ACTwatch outlet survey [20]. Informed by qualitative
interviews with anti-malaria providers on the provenance
of anti-malarial customers and location of competitors,
the geographic definition was set as the commune, an
administrative unit of around 50 km2 and about 3500
inhabitants. A total of 87 geographic markets were
defined.
Measuring market concentration
Market concentration was measured using the Herfindahl-
Hirschman-Index (HHI), which is calculated as the sum of
the squares of the market shares of all providers operating
in the market. US anti-trust agencies generally classify mar-
kets into three types depending on the HHI value: (1)
unconcentrated markets with HHI below 0.15 (2) moder-
ately concentrated markets with HHI between 0.15 and
0.25 or (3) highly concentrated markets with HHI above
0.25 [34]. Market concentration was calculated in terms
of the volume of anti-malarial sales, using data on all
anti-malarials stocked at each anti-malarial outlet sur-
veyed. Market concentration was also calculated in terms
of the value of anti-malarial sales. As it did not make a dif-
ference in the study results, the paper focuses on the ana-
lysis conducted using market concentration calculated on
anti-malarial sales volumes. Both private and public anti-
malarial sales were included in the calculations, with all
government outlets within each market treated as one
provider on the basis that government providers were not
expected to compete with one another. Because of vari-
ation in dosage and formulations across different anti-
malarials, sales volume data were calculated in terms of
adult equivalent treatment doses (AETDs), defined as the
number of milligrams of an anti-malarial drug needed to
treat a 60 kilogramme adult [20]. Missing sales volume
data (around 14 % of all sale volume data) were imputed
using the mean matching multiple imputation method in
Stata 11 [35]. The method uses a standard linear regres-
sion of sales volumes on a set of explanatory variables
to obtain predictions. Variables hypothesized to explain
most of the variation in sales volumes across outlet and
anti-malarial types included geographical location, anti-
malarial category, brand name, generic type, dosage form
and manufacturer [36].
Estimating market accessibility and malaria transmission
risk levels
Accessibility was measured as the time required to travel
in a 4-wheel drive vehicle from each commune to the
main city of the closest main commercial area, defined
as the closest province with more than 5 % of all com-
mercial establishments in the country. Markets were
grouped into 3 categories: “accessible” (markets located
less than 2.5 h from the closest commercial area);
“moderately accessible” (2.5–4.5 h); and “remote” (more
than 4.5 h). Following the MOH malaria transmission
risk categorization, markets were classified at “high
risk” of malaria transmission if they were located less
than 250 m from the forest, at “moderate risk” if lo-
cated between 250 m and less than 1 km from the for-
est, and at “low risk” if located 1 km or more from the
forest. For markets that covered areas with different
risk levels, the number of people living in the different
risk level categories was calculated using 2008 census
data [37] and markets were assigned the level of risk
that was most common in that area in terms of number
of inhabitants exposed.
Modelling price setting decisions
At each commercial retail outlet and for each anti-
malarial product stocked, purchase and selling prices were
calculated per AETD. For each product, the percent mark-
up was calculated as the difference between selling price
and purchase price, divided by purchase price and multi-
plied by 100. Percent mark-ups were preferred to absolute
mark-ups (the difference between selling and purchase
prices) as they offered a measure of retailers’ decisions
“standardized” by price level. Price and mark-up data were
summarized by calculating the median and inter-quartile
range.
In the regression models, percent mark-ups were used
as the dependent variable. Mark-ups were modelled rather
than retail prices as to a large degree retail prices are
determined by factors at the manufacture and wholesale
levels, which are beyond the control of retail providers
and therefore not expected to be affected by local retail
market conditions.
Percent mark-up data from commercial retail outlets
were analysed for all generic types and formulations of
anti-malarials with more than one observation available.
Percent mark-ups were log transformed because of their
skewed distribution and regressed using Ordinary Least
Square (OLS) on a set of market, outlet and product char-
acteristics (Table 1). To present the effect of a change in a
dependent variable on mark-ups rather than on log mark-
ups, coefficients were back-transformed by calculating
their exponent.
Correlation coefficients between the variables used
in our model are presented in Additional file 1. The
Stata survey estimation command svy:regress was used
to adjust for potential clustering of drug price ob-
servations within outlets, to control for design-based
heteroscedasticity and to produce robust variance esti-
mates (StataCorp [38]). Markets with a single anti-
malarial outlet were treated as single sampling units
with their variance imputed using the average of the
variances from strata with several anti-malarial outlets
(StataCorp [38]).
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Sales, price and mark-up data analyses used weights to
account for the outlet survey sampling strategy, which
included a census of commercial and government outlets
in sub-districts of varying size selected using probability
proportional to size, and variation in the size of the strata.
Sub-district weights, which were weights equal to the
inverse of the probability that a sub-district was se-
lected, were applied during data analysis using the Stata
commands aweight or svyset depending on the calcula-
tions performed [20].
A first model (Model 1) of percent mark-ups was de-
veloped, as below, where ε is the error term:
Table 1 Description of variables used in the model of anti-malarial price mark-ups
Variables Definition Mean
Log Price Mark-Ups Log of retail percent price mark-up on one adult equivalent treatment dose 3.81
Market characteristics
Concentration Hirschman Herfindahl index on private and public sector anti-malarial
sales volumes by marketa
0.33
High malaria risk (reference) 1 if market is at high malaria transmission risk 0.23
Moderate malaria risk 1 if market is at moderate malaria transmission risk 0.39
Low malaria risk 1 if market is at low malaria transmission risk 0.38
Remote (reference) 1 if market is remote (more than 4.5 h drive to closest commercial centre) 0.23
Moderately accessible 1 if market is moderately accessible (between 2.5 and 4.5 h drive) 0.43
Highly accessible 1 if market is accessible (less than 2.5 h drive) 0.33
Outlet characteristics
Located in areas without drug resistance (reference) 1 if area is without drug resistance 0.39
Located in areas with suspected/confirmed drug resistance 1 if area with resistance suspected or confirmed 0.61
Pharmacies/Clinical Pharmacies (reference) 1 if outlet is pharmacy/clinical pharmacy 0.24
Drug Shop 1 if outlet is drug store 0.22
Mobile Provider 1 if outlet is mobile provider 0.24
Grocery Store 1 if outlet grocery store 0.13
Village Shop 1 if outlet is village shop 0.16
Collects supplies from wholesaler 1 if none of the wholesalers deliver supplies to outlet 0.59
Receives supplies delivered by wholesalers 1 if at least one top supplier delivers 0.41
No years in operation Number of years outlet has been in operation 10.7
No AETD sold in past 1 week Number of adult equivalent treatment doses of anti-malarials sold in
the previous week
2.19
Product characteristics
Tablet (reference) 1 if anti-malarial is in tablet form 0.89
Injectable 1 if anti-malarial is in injectable form 0.11
Not branded (reference) 1 if anti-malarial is unbranded generic 0.73
Branded 1 if anti-malarial is branded innovator or generic 0.27
Artesunate + Mefloquine (reference) 1 if anti-malarial is ACT artesunate + mefloquine 0.49
Artemether 1 is anti-malarial is artemether 0.06
Artesunate 1 if anti-malarial is artesunate 0.15
Chloroquine 1 if anti-malarial is chloroquine 0.07
Dihydroartemisinin 1 if anti-malarial is dihydroartemisinin 0.01
Dihydroartemisinin + Piperaquine 1 if anti-malarial is dihydroartemisin + piperaquine 0.05
Mefloquine 1 if anti-malarial is mefloquine 0.01
Quinine 1 if anti-malarial is quinine 0.12
Sulfadoxine-Pyrimethamine 1 if anti-malarial is sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine 0.24
Dihydroartemisinin + Piperaquine + Primaquine 1 if anti-malarial is ACT dihydroartemisin + piperaquine + primaquine 0.03
ageographical definition of retail markets was set as the commune
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logmark−up ¼ β0 þ β1HHI þ β2 stratumþ β3accessibility
þβ4risk þ β5outlet type þ β6supplier delivers
þ β7time in operation þ β8generic type
þβ9brand status þ β10dosage form
þβ11volumes sold þ ε
It is possible that a change in concentration may have
affected mark-ups differently in markets with different
characteristics, including accessibility or malaria transmis-
sion risk levels. Therefore a second model (Model 2)
was estimated to explore the effect of interactions be-
tween market concentration, accessibility and risk on
percent mark-ups:
logmark−up ¼ β0 þ β1HHI þ β2 stratumþ β3accessibility
þβ4risk þ β5 HHI  accessibility
þβ6HHI  risk þ β7outlet type
þβ8supplier deliversþ β9time in operation
þβ10generic type þ β11brand status
þβ12dosage formþ β13volumes sold þ ε
All interaction terms were included at once, and the stat-
istical significance of their effect on retail percent mark-
ups tested using the adjusted Wald test. Where the effect
of an interaction term was not statistically significant, it
was dropped and the model re-run to assess the effect on
the remaining interaction terms and other estimates. Insig-
nificant interaction terms were dropped one at a time and
the process repeated until the best fitting model was
identified. Coefficients and 95 % CI of linear combinations
of predictor variables were calculated using the Stata post-
estimation command lincom [38].
Results
Market structure
The number of anti-malarial providers was very variable
across the 87 markets, ranging from 1 to 32, with a mean
of 5 per market. In 61 % of the markets, both government
and commercial providers dispensed anti-malarials, while
in 30 % there were only commercial providers, and in 9 %
only VMWs. Market concentration was measured for 73
of the 87 markets as in 14 markets total sales volumes
were zero. The median HHI was 0.50 (IQR 0.34-0.74),
which indicates high concentration according to US anti-
trust guidelines [34]. Around 43 % of markets were classi-
fied as remote, 32 % as moderately accessible and 25 % as
accessible. In terms of malaria transmission risk, 51 % of
markets were at moderate risk, 31 % at low risk and 18 %
at high risk. Accessible markets were roughly equally dis-
tributed across the three malaria transmission risk levels.
By contrast, significantly more remote markets were at
moderate risk of malaria (73 %) than at low (18 %) or high
(9 %) risk. Moderately accessible markets were more com-
monly at low risk (43 %) than at moderate (36 %) or high
(21 %) risk.
Retail prices and percent mark-ups
The median retail price of one AETD varied across anti-
malarial category, formulation and outlet type (Table 2).
In tablet form, ACT was sold at a median price of
US$1.18, compared to US$0.41 for oral non-artemisinin
products and US$3.62 for oral AMT. Mark-ups varied
across commercial provider types and anti-malarial drugs:
the median percent mark-up for ACT ranged between
29 % at village shops and 50 % at drug shops and mobile
providers; on oral AMT between 15 % at pharmacies/
clinical pharmacies and 60 % at village shops; and on
oral non-artemisinin monotherapies between 54 % at
pharmacies/clinical pharmacies and 367 % at village
shops (Table 3).
Determinants of retail percent mark-ups
Model 1 had an adjusted R2 of 0.144 (Table 4). Percent
mark-ups were significantly affected by anti-malarial gen-
eric type and brand status, generally reflecting higher
percent mark-ups on cheaper products. Mark-ups on
the AMT artesunate and non-artemisinin product chloro-
quine were 60 % (95 % CI 0.45–0.79) and 197 % (95 % CI
1.40–2.77) of the ACT mark-up, respectively. Mark-ups
on branded anti-malarials were 66 % (95 % CI 0.51–0.99)
of the mark-up on unbranded products. Other product,
outlet and market characteristics, including the HHI, had
no significant influence on percent mark-ups. Model 2
(the interacted model) had an adjusted R2 of 0.168 (Table 4).
The effect of the interaction between HHI and malaria
transmission risk was not statistically significant (adjusted
Wald test p = 0.300) so the term was excluded from the
model. Percent mark-ups were significantly affected by
market concentration in markets of different levels of ac-
cessibility. In remote areas, an increase of the HHI by 0.1
was associated with lower mark-ups (53 %, 95 % CI
0.33–0.85). By contrast, in moderately accessible areas,
an increase of the HHI by 0.1 was associated with higher
mark-ups (280 %, 95 % CI 1.50–5.25). As observed in
Model 1, percent mark-ups were also significantly affected
by anti-malarial generic type and brand status.
Discussion
This is the first study to investigate the market for mal-
aria treatment in Cambodia using an economic lens, by
exploring the determinants of commercial providers’ pri-
cing decisions for anti-malarial drugs. For the interpret-
ation of the study results, a few issues should be taken
into account. The analysis of competition requires the
difficult task of defining markets on product and geographic
dimensions. Outlet census and drug audit data were used to
set the product definition as all anti-malarial drug types
stocked by all outlets selling anti-malarials. Using the
administrative boundary approach, the geographical defin-
ition was set as the commune. Ideally household data on
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treatment seeking behaviour (location and type of pro-
vider visited and drugs obtained) would be used for defin-
ing the product and geographic definition of the markets,
but these data were not available at the time of our study.
The definition of markets was therefore validated through
qualitative interviews with commercial providers during
which information on the provenance of their customers
and location of competitors were collected. It is possible
that retailers overestimated the degree of competition they
faced, as has been observed elsewhere [32], notably from
government providers, and that the geographical size of
markets was overestimated in the study. However, in the
context of Cambodia, where mobile providers represented
an important source of anti-malarial drugs [20], it is most
likely that a narrower definition of the market boundaries,
such as the village, could have underestimated the size of
retail markets.
Market concentration measures included both private
and public anti-malarial sales, with all government outlets
within each market treated as one provider on the basis
that government providers were not expected to compete
with one another. It is possible that this analytical
approach distorted market concentration measures that
were later used in the analysis of retail mark-ups, by mask-
ing the impact of the relative importance of private sales
volumes on private retailers’ mark-ups. This could have
been one reason for the difference in the nature of the re-
lationship between mark-ups and concentration in mar-
kets at different accessibility levels. However, qualitative
interviews with commercial providers highlighted the
competitive pressure from VMWs in areas where they op-
erated. Therefore, it was deemed important to include the
volumes dispensed at government outlets in the analysis
of market concentration as excluding them might have
underrepresented the degree of retail competition. This
analytical approach was also validated by estimating a
model of mark-ups excluding government sales and
found the same results as in the models presented here.
Differences in wealth across markets may also have in-
fluenced retailers’ pricing decisions as, for example, they
may have charged higher prices in settings where cus-
tomers had greater willingness-to-pay. Data on household
socio-economic status were not available for these mar-
kets at the time of analysis, but the accessibility measure
Table 2 Retail prices of one adult equivalent treatment dose (US$)
Anti-malarial categories
formulation
Retailer categories
All N = 382 Pharmacies/ Clinical
pharmacies N = 77
Drug stores
N = 75
Mobile providers
N = 101
Grocery stores
N = 57
Village shops
N = 72
ACT (n) (454) (130) (101) (106) (53) (64)
All were tablets Median 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.65 1.11 1.55
IQR 0.94–1.18 0.71–1.18 0.94–1.18 1.18–2.15 0.71–1.65 1.06–2.12
AMT (n) (186) (34) (40) (46) (29) (37)
All Median 4.52 3.61 4.52 4.52 3.61 4.52
IQR 3.01–12.71 2.44–3.62 2.82–4.52 3.39–22.60 3.01–4.52 3.62–4.52
AMT (n) (129) (15) (31) (26) (25) (32)
Tablet Median 3.62 2.64 3.16 3.77 3.62 4.52
IQR 2.64–3.61 0.00–2.64 2.64–3.16 2.26–4.52 3.01–4.52 3.62–4.52
AMT (n) (57) (19) (9) (20) (4) (5)
Injectable Median 22.60 15.10 19.80 22.60 22.60 28.25
IQR 15.06–26.36 11.30–15.10 18.83–19.77 16.94–28.24 18.83–22.60 28.25–28.25
nAMT (n) (88) (22) (16) (22) (13) (15)
All Median 0.46 0.23 0.23 7.41 0.46 1.18
IQR 0.23–7.41 0.08–0.23 0.23–0.23 0.46–9.88 0.34–0.46 0.46–11.86
nAMT (n) (68) (22) (13) (10) (10) (13)
Tablet Median 0.41 0.23 0.23 0.46 0.46 0.68
IQR 0.23–0.41 0.08–0.23 0.23–0.23 3.41–0.46 0.23–0.46 0.35–11.86
nAMT (n) (20) (0) (3) (12) (3) (2)
Injectable Median 9.89 - 14.83 9.89 5.93 17.30
IQR 7.41–14.83 14.83–14.83 7.41–12.36 3.95–12.36 9.88–17.30
ACT is artemisinin combination therapy; AMT is artemisinin monotherapy; nAMT is non-artemisinin monotherapy; (n) is number of product observations; N is
number of retailers for whom information was available; IQR is inter-quartile range. “-“drug category not stocked
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may to some degree have captured this as the accessibility
of markets would be expected to be positively associated
with household wealth.
It is possible that commercial providers underreported
stocking of banned anti-malarial drugs such as AMT, or
deliberately misrepresented their pricing behaviour,
perhaps by reporting lower selling prices, as they would
not want to be seen as making excessive profits, which
would have led to an underestimation of mark-ups. Also,
the percent mark-ups measured gross margins, which in-
clude other costs of selling, and therefore higher mark-ups
may not have been a sign of higher net profit margins.
Finally, commercial providers’ price setting behaviour
and the extent of price competition in retail markets were
analysed by following the traditional SCP approach, inves-
tigating whether more concentrated markets were associ-
ated with higher mark-ups. Limitations of this approach
that hypothesizes a causal link between structure and con-
duct, combined with that of using HHI as the measure of
market competition, are widely recognized in the indus-
trial organization literature [39, 40]. Market concentration
as measured by the HHI may be endogenous, that is
the result of providers’ pricing decision, demand or cost
factors [30, 41]. For example, firms that can produce at
a lower cost have the ability to charge lower prices and
are therefore likely to have higher market shares than
firms with higher costs.
The study assessed the relationship between percent
mark-ups for anti-malarials, market concentration mea-
sured by the HHI and a set of other market, product
and outlet characteristics. In Model 1, no evidence of a
significant statistical relationship between anti-malarial
mark-ups and the HHI was found, which from a traditional
economic theory perspective was surprising. Given the het-
erogeneity of the markets under study in terms of concen-
tration, the relationship between anti-malarial mark-ups
and the HHI in markets at different accessibility and mal-
aria transmission risk levels was explored in Model 2. The
expected positive association between HHI and mark-ups
was observed in moderately accessible markets only. In
these markets, a higher concentration may have indicated
less intense competition, offering commercial providers
the opportunity to charge higher mark-ups. By contrast,
in remote markets an increase in the HHI led to lower
mark-ups. One explanation for this difference may be
that market concentration was not capturing variations
Table 3 Retail percent mark-ups on one adult equivalent treatment dose (%)
Anti-malarial categories
formulation
Retailer categories
All N = 382 Pharmacies/ Clinical
pharmacies N = 77
Drug stores
N = 75
Mobile providers
N = 101
Grocery stores
N = 57
Village shops
N = 72
ACT (n) (418) (119) (85) (103) (51) (59)
all were tablets Median 42.8 40.0 50.0 50.0 40.0 28.6
IQR 20.0–75.0 20.0–80.0 25.0–106.9 25.0–66.7 20.0–60.0 14.3–55.6
AMT (n) (177) (32) (37) (46) (29) (33)
All Median 37.1 16.7 29.2 42.9 33.3 60.0
IQR 20.0–66.7 7.1–42.9 16.7–55.5 25.0–71.4 20.0–41.2 42.9–84.6
AMT (n) (121) (13) (28) (26) (25) (29)
Tablet Median 37.1 15.4 37.1 33.3 33.3 60.0
IQR 20.0–71.4 7.7–25.9 16.7–90.5 25.0–66.7 20.0–41.2 37.1–87.5
AMT (n) (56) (19) (9) (20) (4) (4)
Injectable Median 40.0 28.0 29.0 50.0 38.5 47.1
IQR 19.0–55.6 7.1–42.9 16.7–41.2 25.0–77.8 20.0–42.9 42.9–66.7
nAMT (n) (84) (18) (16) (22) (13) (15)
All Median 100.0 53.8 100.0 127.3 177.8 100.0
IQR 50.0–185.7 7.1–100.0 66.7–150.0 50.0–185.7 33.3–185.7 66.7–150.0
nAMT (n) (64) (18) (13) (10) (10) (13)
Tablet Median 100.0 53.8 100.0 100.0 185.7 366.7
IQR 50–185.7 7.1–100.0 66.7–115.5 80–233.3 33.3–185.7 66.7–366.7
nAMT (n) (20) - (3) (12) (3) (2)
Injectable Median 166.7 - 191.7 150.0 33.3 366.7
IQR 50.0–200.0 - 191.7–275.0 50.0–185.7 17.6–177.8 66.7–366.7
ACT is artemisinin combination therapy; AMT is artemisinin monotherapy; nAMT is non-artemisinin monotherapy; (n) is number of product observations; N is
number of retailers for whom information was available; IQR is inter-quartile range. “-“drug category not stocked
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Table 4 Relationship between percent mark-ups and market, outlet and product characteristics (N = 640 anti-malarials)
Model 1 Model 2
Variables Regression
coefficient
95 % Confidence-interval Regression
coefficient
95 % Confidence-interval
Market characteristics
Concentration_HHI volumes 0.79 (0.54–1.16) 0.53*** (0.33–0.85)
At high malaria risk (reference) - -
At moderate malaria risk 0.80 (0.61–1.05) 0.78* (0.59–1.03)
At low malaria risk 0.88 (0.67–1.16) 0.89 (0.67–1.19)
Remote (reference) - -
Moderately accessible 1.01 (0.72–1.42) 0.50** (0.29–0.88)
Highly accessible 0.88 (0.68–1.13) 0.85 (0.55–1.34)
Concentration_HHI X Remote (reference) -
Concentration_HHI X Moderately accessible 5.58*** (2.10–14.88)
Concentration_HHI X Highly accessible 0.84 (0.35–2.03)
Outlet characteristics
Located in areas without drug resistance (reference) - -
Located in areas with suspected/confirmed drug resistance 0.97 (0.74–1.27) 1.00 (0.77–1.30)
Pharmacies/Clinical Pharmacies (reference) - - -
Drug Shop 1.17 (0.86–1.60) 1.14 (0.84–1.54)
Mobile Provider 1.14 (0.84–1.54) 1.02 (0.76–1.38)
Grocery Store 0.90 (0.64–1.27) 0.87 (0.63–1.21)
Village Shop 1.15 (0.75–1.75) 1.04 (0.68–1.60)
Suppliers deliver 1.05 (0.85–1.30) 1.07 (0.87–1.31)
Number of years in operation (year) 0.99* (0.98–1.00) 0.99* (0.98–1.00)
Number of AETD sold in past 1 week 0.99* (0.98–1.00) 0.99* (0.98–1.00)
Product characteristics
Tablet (reference) - -
Injectable 1.21 (0.72–2.01) 1.22 (0.73–2.05)
Not branded (reference) - -
Branded 0.66*** (0.51–0.99) 0.66*** (0.51–0.85)
Artesunate + Mefloquine (reference) - -
Artemether 0.71 (0.40–1.28) 0.69 (0.38–1.26)
Artesunate 0.60*** (0.45–0.79) 0.61*** (0.45–0.80)
Chloroquine 1.97*** (1.40–2.77) 2.03*** (1.43–2.86)
Dihydroartemisinin 0.52 (0.11–2.53) 0.54 (0.13–2.34)
Dihydroartemisinin + Piperaquine 1.07 (0.64–1.79) 1.11 (0.65–1.88)
Mefloquine 0.68 (0.43–1.08) 0.67 (0.42–1.06)
Quinine 1.26 (0.68–2.34) 1.25 (0.67–2.32)
Sulfadoxine-Pyrimethamine 1.32 (0.86–2.03) 1.23 (0.79–1.92)
Dihydroartemisinin + Piperaquine + Primaquine 1.38 (0.88–2.16) 1.51 (0.96–2.36)
Constant 84.77*** (49.40–146.94) 108.85*** (62.18–188.67)
Observations 640
Adjusted R-squared 0.144 0.168
Coefficients presented in this table are the back-transformed coefficients from the log-linear model. Coefficients were back-transformed by calculating their exponent.
The statistical significance of the back-transformed coefficients is therefore inferred by whether 1 is excluded in the 95 % confidence interval. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1; − is the reference group
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in competitive pressure. With most (82 %) remote mar-
kets experiencing moderate or high risk of malaria trans-
mission, lower mark-ups in more concentrated markets
may have indicated the competitive pressure of VMWs’
supply of free treatment in areas where they operated,
leading private providers to limit their pricing. It is also
plausible that retailers operating in hard-to-reach, less
populated communes at higher risk of malaria transmis-
sion may have put greater emphasis on socially oriented
objectives relative to profit maximization. Higher mark-
ups in less concentrated remote markets may also have
reflected higher costs, for example the costs of transport-
ing anti-malarial supplies. Overall, whilst the price of ACT
was set above the recommended retail price, market con-
centration and mark-ups were not positively associated
in most markets. Inadequate ACT coverage for malaria
treatment in the private sector was therefore unlikely to
primarily reflect excessive retail mark-ups on ACT, and
instead reflect other key elements of medicine demand
and supply.
Even at a subsidized price, ACT wholesale prices were
much higher than those of non-artemisinin monother-
apies [21], meaning that even with relatively competitive
mark-ups, ACT retail prices were more than two times
higher, and therefore may have been beyond the reach of
some consumers. Furthermore, while AMT were sold at
substantially higher prices than ACT, it may be common
for consumers to purchase incomplete doses of AMT as
observed elsewhere [42], implying that the price of one
adult equivalent treatment dose did not reflect what con-
sumers usually paid [20]. The negative externality of in-
creased pressure for the development of drug resistance
caused by AMT use, particularly at low doses, would
not be considered by consumers. Also, as noted in the
introduction, purchase of drug “cocktails” is common in
Cambodia for treating illnesses, including malaria and fe-
vers in general [23]. Although these mixtures of tablets
may not contain any anti-malarial, they are often seen as
more effective than pre-packaged medicines at treating
multiple symptoms [23] and may be perceived by con-
sumers as a substitute for ACT. Overall, it is likely that in-
formation on the relative efficacy of ACT was far from
perfect among consumers.
The study results indicate that provider pricing may
have played an important role in the performance of the
market for malaria treatment in Cambodia. At the time
of the study, the subsidized ACT wholesale price was
US$0.42, which was much higher than the wholesale price
of chloroquine (US$0.08), the most popular monotherapy
[20, 21]. There may therefore be potential to decrease
ACT wholesale and retail prices by applying larger sub-
sidies, such as those provided through the Affordable
Medicines Facility – malaria (AMFm). The AMFm imple-
mented in seven African countries made ACT available at
a highly subsidized price at the manufacturer level [43],
representing 1–20 % of the ex-factory prices [44]. After
the introduction of the AMFm, large increases in ACT
availability and large decreases in ACT median retail
prices were observed in the private sector of most, though
not all participating countries [44]. The pooled purchasing
power within the AMFm programme also facilitated price
negotiations to reduce manufacturer ACT prices [45].
Cambodia was initially included in the group of countries
eligible to participate in the Phase 1 of the AMFm pilot
but later excluded due to the lack of a first line drug
complying with the quality assurance policy of the Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria [46]. With
a quality approved drug now available for Cambodia, an
AMFm-like subsidy may have the potential to decrease
wholesale and retail prices as observed in other settings.
Experiences in using RRPs on anti-malarial drugs have
proved to have different effects on consumer prices across
settings [47–49]. In Cambodia, since the start of the na-
tional programme in 2001, the subsidized ACT always had
a printed RRP though retail prices generally exceeded it
[24, 47]. Little research has been conducted in Cambodia
on the level at which RRP should be set. At the time of
our study, the RRP for ACT was US$ 0.61, based on a
study on consumers’ willingness to pay conducted some
years previously [50]. During qualitative interviews con-
ducted in 2009, several private retailers argued that the
RRP was set too low and did not provide sufficient
profits [21]. Generating evidence on commercial pro-
viders’ overhead costs including transport, rent, staff, etc.
and their relative importance should be considered when
investigating the levels of profit perceived to be “sufficient”
by private providers. However, during qualitative inter-
views, some retailers in Cambodia reported that when
consumers were informed about the RRP, they were con-
strained to sell the subsidized ACT at that recommended
price [21], supporting the use of RRP combined with
effective communications to consumers. A similar ob-
servation can be made from the experiences of coun-
tries included in the AMFm pilot. In the three countries
in which timely communication campaigns about the
AMFm subsidy and RRP were implemented, including
Kenya, the Republic of Tanzania (mainland and Zanzibar)
and Ghana, median ACT prices were at the RRP levels. By
contrast, in countries where promotion activities were
delayed or less intense, the median ACT price was above
the RRP [49].
Even with lower wholesale prices, retailers may be re-
luctant to stock ACT if they expect consumer demand
to be low because of lack of information on what consti-
tutes appropriate quality malaria treatment. Expanding
and intensifying social marketing-like activities, including
road shows, radio messages and TV ads combined with
increased communication on the regulatory framework
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could improve consumer information on the need for
confirmed diagnosis prior treatment, ACT efficacy com-
pared to older anti-malarial drugs, the potential dangers
of cocktail therapies and the negative social externalities
of AMT in terms of drug resistance. These activities could
also be expanded to non-malarial areas in the context of
mobile populations with no or little immunity to malaria
who travel to forested areas. Finally, active and supportive
regulation has a key role to play in improving the per-
formance of the market for malaria treatment, through
measures to stop the importation and distribution of oral
AMTand the marketing of cocktail therapies, and through
supportive and educative activities with private providers
of malaria treatment.
Conclusion
This study investigates the factors influencing pricing
decisions for anti-malarial drugs in Cambodia and contrib-
utes to the limited literature on the functioning of health
markets in low income countries. Percent mark-ups
were significantly affected by anti-malarial characteristics,
including generic type and brand status, generally reflect-
ing higher mark-ups on cheaper products. They were also
influenced by retail market concentration, although differ-
ently in markets at different levels of accessibility, pointing
to the heterogeneity of anti-malarial markets in terms
of structural characteristics. Key elements of anti-malarial
supply and demand, including wholesale pricing and con-
sumer information were however likely to play a bigger
role in explaining the limited access to appropriate malaria
treatment in Cambodia. The potential for decreasing
ACT prices at different levels of the distribution chain by
applying a larger subsidy, notably at the manufacturer level,
combined with intensive promotion activities towards
consumers and strict but supportive regulatory measures
should be explored for improving access to appropriate
malaria treatment in the private commercial sector in
Cambodia.
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